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Juvenile delinquency is unquestionably one of America's serious problems.
Federal, state, and local governments as well as the academic community and
many private individuals have struggled with little success against rising juvenile
crime. The total number of juveniles arrested in 1973 for all offenses was
1,717,366, or more than one-fourth of the total persons apprehended in the
United States.' Between 1960 and 1973, the number of juveniles arrested in-
creased 144 percent2 while the population of the United States increased only
16 percent.3
Since the end of the 19th century, the primary answer to the nation's
juvenile delinquency problem has been the juvenile court system. This system
was criticized in the 1960's for failing to provide constitutional protections to
juveniles that were afforded to adults. The criticism culminated with the United
States Supreme Court decisions of Kent v. United States' and In re Gault' which
applied many constitutional due process safeguards to the juvenile courts.
At about the same time as these decisions were having an impact on the
juvenile courts, another idea for change to the juvenile justice system was gaining
impetus: pretrial diversion. The President's Commission on Juvenile Delin-
quency and Youth Crime in 1967' recommended that "dispositional alternatives
to juvenile court adjudication must be developed."' This interest in diversion of
juvenile cases naturally resulted from the realization that since Kent and Gault,
the only significant differences between juvenile courts and adult criminal courts
are in the informal pretrial stage and postadjudication disposition.8 If juveniles
are to be treated in any way different from adults, therefore, the difference must
come at these two stages of the juvenile justice system.
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2 Id.
3 Id.; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES: 1974,
at 5 (1974).
4 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
& ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
7 Id. at 2.
8 See generally Ralston, Intake: Informal Disposition or Adversary Proceeding, 17 CmME
& DELiNQ. 160, 167 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ralston].
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DIVERSION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
Diversion is an alternative to juvenile court adjudication that operates at
the pretrial stage. It is "the channeling of cases to non-court institutions or sys-
tems in instances where the cases would ordinarily have been processed by the
juvenile court."' Though diversion processes vary greatly, they all are relatively
informal, for constitutional protections applicable to formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings have not been applied to diversion. It is arguable, then, that diversion
deprives youth of many fundamental rights, particularly the right to counsel and
the right to a probable cause determination prior to the diversion decision.
Whether these rights should be applied is a proper subject for analysis.
II. The Background: Juvenile Courts and Diversion
In the 18th century, juveniles were treated exactly like adults. Not until
1825, when New York City's House of Refuge was opened, were children
separated from adult criminals and given corrective treatment rather than
punishment." Other reforms followed gradually and sporadically during the
19th century, including the creation of state juvenile reform and industrial
schools, the development of probation, the requirement for separate hearings
for children's cases, and the use of foster homes and other social dispositions."1
A. The Development of the Juvenile Court System
In 1899, Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act, creating the first statewide
court especially for children. The idea of the juvenile court spread with amazing
speed. Within 12 years, 22 states enacted similar statutes, and by 1925 all but
two states had followed Illinois' example.1 " Today there is a juvenile court act
in effect in every state and territory of the United States and the District of
Columbia."
The juvenile court was a reaction to criticism of combining juvenile delin-
quents and adult criminals in the same judicial and penal system. The separate
court, it was thought, would promote rehabilitation. The child would receive
special treatment in surroundings and from persons devoted to rehabilitation
instead of punishment. 4 The juvenile court's role was not to ascertain guilt or
innocence but to determine what should be done in the "best interest" of the
child.' This unique court system was based on the theory of parens patriae,
9 Nejelski, Diversion of Juvenile Offenders in the Criminal Justice System, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MONOGRAPH: NEW APPROACHES TO DIVERSION AND TREATmENT OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 83 (1973).
10 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1190 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fox]. The latter refer-
ence presents a detailed examination of juvenile judicial history.
11 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; Note, The Constitution and Juvenile Delin-
quents, 32 MONT. L. REv. 307 (1971).
12 These states are Maine and Wyoming. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3;
Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457, 465 (1973).
13 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
14 Comment, Children's Liberation-Reforming Juvenile Justice, 21 KAN. L. RYv. 177
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Children's Liberation].
15 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 114 A.2d 896
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955). See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3; Comment, Alter-
native Preadjudicatory Handling of Juveniles in South Dakota: Time for Reform, 19 S. DAx.
L. REV. 207, 208 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. Dak. Juveniles].
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which permits the state to act in loco parentis over wayward children. The
state's duty as "parent" is to direct the child along the proper path to a produc-
tive and lawful adulthood. 6
Since the state, acting through the juvenile court, had the best interests of
the child at heart, parens patriae became the basis for not granting constitu-
tional rights to children. Under this theory of a benevolent state, it was simply
unnecessary for juveniles to receive notice of the charge prior to court appear-
ance, an adversary hearing, a lawyer, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, and other constitutional safeguards
guaranteed to adult criminals. 7 This denial of constitutional rights was chal-
lenged periodically in state courts, but each time appellate courts upheld the legal-
ity of the system. For instance:
[A] juvenile proceeding . ..is a protective proceeding entirely concerned
with the welfare of the child, and is not punitive. The procedures supercede
the provisions of the criminal law. The inquiry is directed to the proper
care, custody, guidances, control, and discipline of the child, and not to his
guilt or innocence as a criminal offender.. .. For that reason, a juvenile
proceeding may properly dispense with formal constitutional requirements
relating to criminal proceedings.' 8
B. The Constitutional Status of Juvenile Courts
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court finally considered the adequacy
of juvenile court procedures.' Kent v. United States" was the first case to reach
the Court; it involved the interpretation of a statutory provision in the District
of Columbia Code which permitted waiver of a child's case from juvenile court
to adult court.2 The Court felt that a waiver of this magnitude must be judged
by the standards of fourteenth amendment due process. Waiver to adult court
therefore could not take place "without ceremony-without hearing, without
effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons."22 Technically
speaking, though, Kent did not rest on constitutional grounds; the fourteenth
amendment was not explicitly applied, only used as a yardstick. Nor did Kent
affect the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile court. Yet, the Court did express
16 See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). See also Fox, supra note 10, at 1192;
S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15, at 208; Comment, In re Gault: Understanding the Attorney's
New Role, 12 VILL. L. RFv. 803 (1967); Comment, Juvenile Justice and Pre-Adjudication
Detention, 1 U.C.L.A.-ALAsxA L. Rv. 154 (1971).
17 Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. Ryv. 167, 174 [hereinafter cited as Paulsen].
18 State v. Owens, 197 Kan. 212, 220, 416 P.2d 259, 267 (1966). Accord, Ex parte
Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 127, 96 P. 563, 564 (1908); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57,
62 A. 198, 200-01 (1903).
19 For a brief but excellent synopsis of Supreme Court decisions concerning rights of
juveniles, see S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15. Cf. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE
LAW AND PROCEDURE 10-22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PAULSEN & WHITEBREAD].
20 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
21 Waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction occurs when the juvenile court judge, in accord-
ance with statutory provisions, orders the transfer of a child to the regular court for trial under
the ordinary rules of criminal procedure. Waiver is generally restricted to instances where the
child has committed -a serious offense. For a more lengthy discussion of waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction, see PAULSEN & WHITEREAm, supra note 19, at 132-49.
22 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
[October 1975]
DIVERSION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS
skepticism of the theory and operation of juvenile courts, and Kent thus indicated
that the Court favored applying the Constitution to juvenile proceedings.23
Any doubts about the constitutional status of Kent were resolved the next
year by the Court's decision in In re Gault,24 the most important decision involv-
ing the constitutional rights of children. Gault held that the adjudicatory (fact-
finding) stage of the juvenile court process must be governed by due process
standards. Children were to be accorded the right to notice of the charges against
them,25 the right of counsel,26 the privilege against self-incrimination," and the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.2" However, Justice Fortas, who
wrote the Court's majority opinion, carefully limited the scope of Gault to the
adjudicatory stage of the proceeding, leaving open the question whether due
process applied to prejudicial and postadjudicatory stages of the juvenile pro-
cess.
2 9
Most surprising about Kent and Gault was the Court's scathing repudiation
of the effectiveness of the juvenile court in carrying out its stated goal of rehabili-
tation. Citing the high recidivism rate, the serious stigma resulting from an
adjudication of delinquency, and the lack of difference between judicial processes
in juvenile and adult cases, the Court questioned the desirability of separate
juvenile courts.
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children."0
Two other Supreme Court cases since Kent and Gault have decided impor-
tant juvenile constitutional issues. In re Winship3 provided increased protection
to juveniles at the adjudicatory stage. The court held that before a child could
be convicted of delinquency for committing an act which would be a crime if
committed by an adult, the state was required to prove the juvenile's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 2 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,3 however, the Court refused
to grant the right of trial by jury to juveniles. The Court was concerned that
if jury trials were required in juvenile adjudicatory hearings, the proceedings
would become indistinguishable from adult criminal trials. Jury trials, con-
cluded the Court, would convert juvenile hearings into true adversary proceed-
ings and destroy the "intimate, informal protective proceeding[s]"34 that seemed
to be the goal of juvenile court statutes.
Kent, Gault, and Winship, then, granted progressively greater constitutional
23 Id. at 556.
24 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 Id. at 33.
26 Id. at 41, 56.
27 Id. at 55.
28 Id. at 57.
29 Id. at 13.
30 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
31 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32 Id. at 370.
33 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
3t Id. at 545.
(Vol. 51 :22]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
status to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process. And while Mc-
Keiver refused further expansion, it still did not foreclose incursions into the
juvenile justice system:
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed
upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate system.
Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the mo-
ment we are disinclined to give impetus to itA5
McKeiver, therefore, warns the juvenile courts that they must better accomplish
the goals of parens patriae or the Court may again intervene and supply juveniles
with the full array of due process safeguards available to adults in criminal
trials.
36
C. The Movement for Diversion
Even as the juvenile court system was developing, diversion became common
practice. The names and processes37 varied considerably among jurisdictions, but
the concept of handling juvenile cases informally, without resort to the juvenile
courts, caught on spontaneously. By 1926, diversion was so well established that
the National Probation Association recommended that it become a formalized
element of juvenile justice:
[I]t is better for as many cases as possible to be adjusted without a formal
court hearing. The system of handling cases informally, usually through the
probation department, is well recognized and in many courts half or more
of the cases are adjusted in this way.... [TMhe system has grown so wide-
spread and is so generally recognized as beneficial that the committee believes
it should be recognized in the law.
3 8
As the years passed, more and more states utilized diversion until by 1968 over
52 percent of all delinqudncy cases (474,000 out of 899,000) referred to juvenile
courts were disposed of nonjudicially 9
In 1967, the use of diversion received a dramatic boost from the report of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
The formal sanctioning system and pronouncement of delinquency
should be used only as a last resort.
In place of the formal system, dispositional alternatives to adjudication
must be developed for dealing with juveniles, including agencies to provide
and coordinate services and procedures to achieve necessary control without
unnecessary stigma. Alternatives already available, such as those related to
court intake, should be more fully explored."0
35 Id. at 551.
36 See S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15, at 221.
37 For an in-depth discussion of the history of intake, see Wallace & Brennan, Intake and
the Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REv. 442 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Wallace & Brennan].
38 NATIONAL PROBATION Ass'N, A STANDARD JUVENILE COURT LAW 15 "(1926), cited in
Wallace & Brennan, supra note 37, at 444-45.
39 OFFICE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY & YOUTH DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS: 1968, at 12 (1968), cited in Gough, Consent Decrees
and Informal Service in the Juvenile Court: Excursions Toward Balance, 19 KA. L. Rav. 733,
739 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gough].
40 TAse FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
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This conclusion was based on the realization that the juvenile court was not
fulfilling its rehabilitative role.4 In fact, the Commission concluded that juvenile
contact with the court usually harmed the child more than it helped him."2
As one alternative to juvenile court adjudication, the President's Commission
recommended the establishment of Youth Service Bureaus.4" The Youth Service
Bureaus would oversee diversion programs in each community and offer a broad
range of services to young people. Additionally, the Commission recommended
that juvenile courts utilize "preliminary conferences" and "consent decrees" to
arrange out-of-court settlements or adjustments for the child." The aim of all
these efforts was to free the child from the stigma of a juvenile court adjudication
while ensuring proper attention and treatment.
These recommendations were embraced quickly by commentators, juvenile
courts, and government agencies. In 1970, the federal government's Youth
Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration adopted a national
strategy for the prevention of juvenile delinquency." Its first objective was to
"divert youth away from the juvenile justice system into alternate programs."4
More importantly, Congress joined the diversion movement with passage of the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974." This statute pro-
vided federal assistance to juvenile delinquency programs across the nation, and
announced that it was the "declared policy of Congress... to divert juveniles
from the traditional juvenile justice system and to provide critically needed
alternatives .... "
The Commission's recommendation for Youth Service Bureaus was also
rapidly adopted. The development of these bureaus became a policy of the
Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare. In this regard, the Law Enforcement
41 It is interesting to note that the President's Commission, in its Task Force Report, and
the Supreme Court, in Kent and Gault, came to this realization at approximately the same
time.
42 In illuminating fashion the President's Commission summarizes its findings:
What emerges then, is this: In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and
rehabilitative rather than punitive. In fact the distinction often disappears ..
In theory the court's action was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact, a delinquent
is generally viewed by employers, schools, the armed forces-by society generally-
as a criminal. In theory the court was to treat children guilty of criminal acts in
noncriminal ways. In fact it labels truants and runaways as junior criminals.
In theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal . . . because it
would act only in the best interests of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing
more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of law . . .. In
theory it was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant child back into the
fold. In fact there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention reinforces the
juvenile's unlawful impulses. In theory it was to concentrate on each case the best
of current social science learning. In fact it has often become a vested interest in
its turn, loathe to cooperate with innovative programs or avail itself of forward-
looking methods.
TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
43 Id. at 19.
44 Id. at 21.
45 Gemiganani, Diversion of Juvenile Offenders from the Juvenile Justice System, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH: NEw APPROACHES TO DIVERSION AND TREATMENT OF JUvE-
NILE OFFENDERS 8 (1973).
46 Id. at 31.
47 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq. (1970).
48 42 U.S.C. § 5602(b) (1970).
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Assistance Administration has distributed numerous federal grants to states and
local communities to create and operate Youth Service Bureaus.4" By 1972, over
170 bureaus were in operation throughout the United States.5"
D. Diversion Today: Sequence and Procedure
The Commission's report endorsing diversion has had substantial impact;
in various ways, diversion has become integral to juvenile justice in the United
States. The decision whether or not to divert a case from the juvenile courts is
very important to the youth. It can mean the difference between a juvenile court
hearing, with the possibility of confinement to an institution, and outright release.
Between these extremes, diversion may include release with an official reprimand,
referral to a social service agency, or supervision by the court or police. This
important decision may be made either by police or juvenile courts.
1. Police Screening
The vast majority of all juvenile cases are referred by law enforcement
agencies.5 A youth's initial contact with the judicial system is usually the police
officer who has taken the child into custody, either as a result of his own observ-
ance of the criminal act or in response to a citizen complaint. The police officer
has a wide range of alternatives in dealing with the apprehended child. He may
warn and release the child, refer him to juvenile court, or divert the child to a
social agency.
In larger police departments, apprehending officers refer the child to a
department juvenile officer, who is assigned full-time to youth matters. These
officers possess greater expertise in juvenile delinquency than the average police
officer, and generally have investigative facilities to preliminarily examine the
case and the child's background. They also have increased discretion on deciding
what action to take with the child's case."
This decision-making process, often termed the "stationhouse adjustment,"
deprives the youth of many rights that are considered fundamental in other areas
of the law. It is made by nonlegal personnel (the juvenile officer), is usually
conducted without legal counsel, generally does not acknowledge a right to
silence, and concludes in a nonappealable decision." Even if the child is released,
he has gained a "police contact" record.
In some cities, the department juvenile officer makes his diversion decision
49 In 1971, for example, approximately $15 million of federal funds were distributed, to
various Youth Service Bureaus in the nation. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS: A NATIONAL STUDY 3-4, 66-67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as YOUTH
BUREAUS STUDY].
50 Id.
51 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individual Justice, 79 HARv.
L. REV. 775, 776 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Police].
52 Kleczek, Procedure in the Illinois Juvenile Court System, 6 JOHN MARSH. L.J. 48, 51
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Kleczek].
53 Note, Juvenile Court Intake: Form and Function, 5 WILL. L.J. 121, 123 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Juvenile Intake]. For a brief discussion of the lack of appeal from police
screening, see The Police, supra note 51, at 785.
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in a "police hearing." In these hearings, the officer determines which cases
require the attention of the court. In reality, this latter system is merely a more
formal (and therefore more impressive to the child) "stationhouse adjustment" ;54
the procedural rights of the youth, or lack of them, are no different.
2. Intake by the Juvenile Court
When a case is forwarded to the juvenile court from the police (or by any
other method of initiating a complaint against a child), it is handled first by
the intake department. Since early in their history, juvenile courts have had in-
take departments which exercised discretion whether or not to hear a case; this
was the earliest form of diversion. This discretion has continually expanded, and
now intake may be defined as:
[A] process of examining and evaluating the circumstances of every case
referred to the court. It is directed initially at ascertaining which cases
require no action, which require referral to other agencies, which can be
benefitted and adjusted by treatment without judicial action, and which
need judicial action.-5
Although all juvenile courts have intake departments, the intake process is
handled in a variety of ways.
6
In some courts, intake has the form of a judicial hearing, often before a
referee. In others, it is an extended process involving what is tantamount to
a complete diagnostic study. In still others, it is a mechanical process in the
clerk's office providing little if any selectivity. 57
Despite expanded police screening methods, diversion by intake departments
remains high. The average court intake office diverts approximately one-half of
all cases referred to it.5"
The intake officer's decision is, of course, crucial to the child. The alter-
natives include outright dismissal of the petition, informal probation administered
by the intake staff,59 and referral to a social agency. The decision is usually made
54 The Police, supra note 51, at 779. In whatever manner diversion by the police is
effectuated-by the apprehending officer, by a specially designated juvenile officer, or by a
police hearing-there is little doubt that the practice is common. A 1965 study in Chicago
revealed a 66 percent diversion rate, while a 1970 survey of Los Angeles County showed
diversion rates for its precincts ranging from two to 82 percent. FBI statistics for 1961-65
disclose that between 45 and 55 percent of all juveniles taken into custody by the police were
not referred to court. See Stratton, Crisis Intervention Counseling and Police Diversion from
the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 25 Juv. JusTicn 44, 48 (1974).
55 ADvIsoRY COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N, GumEs
FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 24 (1957), cited in Juvenile Intake, supra note 53, at 124.
56 Note, Informal Disposition of Delinquency Cases: Survey and Comparison of Court
Delegation of Decision Making, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 258, 279 [hereinafter cited as Informal
Disposition].
57 Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. FAMmY L. 139, 146 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Sheridan].
58 CHILDRnN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUc. & WELFARE, JUVENILE COURT
STATIsTIcs: 1963, at 11 (1964), cited in Juvenile Intake, supra note 53, at 124.
59 In some jurisdictions, the intake officer has the ability to impose "informal probation"
on the juvenil% in an attempt to rehabilitate the youth without judicial involvement. Such
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following an intake conference or hearing,6" in which the officer or "referee"
meets with the child, his parent or guardian, the petitioner (police officer or
citizen complainant), his probation officer (if the child has one from a previous
juvenile court contact), and occasionally an attorney." The intake officer may
make his dispositional decision based upon a wide variety of reasons, and, as with
police screening, the decision is nonappealable.
III. Constitutional Problems of Diversion
Less than a decade ago the idea of constitutional rights for children was
foreign to the legal profession. Under the parens patriae principle, juvenile court
proceedings were not criminal trials, but civil inquiries to determine the mode
of rehabilitation. The constitutional rights normally afforded an accused adult
had no place in these proceedings.62 During the period 1966-71, this reliance
on parens patriae to deny constitutional rights to juveniles was significantly
altered by the United States Supreme Court.
As discussed earlier,63 the Court's decisions in Kent v. United States,64 In
re Gault, 5 In re Winship,6" and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania7 established basic
constitutional parameters for juvenile courts. 8 Kent introduced the requirement
of due process and fundamental fairness to the juvenile system. Gault specifically
applied the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the adjudicative
stage of juvenile justice.69 In McKeiver, the Court refused to require trial by jury
in juvenile courts, but allowed that further extension might be necessary in the
future.70
In light of this breakdown of the parens patriae principle, which previously
isolated the juvenile system from constitutional scrutiny, diversion may be vulner-
able to constitutional challenge. Although Gault was limited to adjudicative
proceedings, it is only since Gault that diversion has become paramount in juve-
nile justice. The diversion decision now is crucial, and the lack of procedural
safeguards begs to be rectified. Other aspects of the diversion system have also
informal probation may consist of any number of requirements, restrictions, or duties that
the juvenile must comply with, such as reporting to a probation officer, securing employment,
or attending educational classes. Because this practice of "informal probation" has come under
increasing criticism in recent years, the restrictions have become more moderate and less fre-
quently applied. See Wallace & Brennan, supra note 37, at 446; The Police, supra note 51,
at 789.
60 For a discussion of how one jurisdiction conducts its intake hearings, see Informal
Disposition, supra note 56, at 272-77.
61 The Police, supra note 51, at 789.
62 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14, 17 (1967).
63 See text accompanying notes 19-36 supra.
64 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
65 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
66 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
68 For a review and analysis of these decisions, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 531-34 (1971). Cf. Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings:
A Non-Polar Approach, 61 GEo. L.J. 1401, 1406-09 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kay &
Segal]; Note, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77 DicK. L. av.
543, 546-50 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Parent's Presence]; S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15,
at 209-11.
69 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).
70 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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been criticized for failing to sufficiently respect the rights of children." In this
context, therefore, it is important to analyze diversion from a constitutional
perspective. Can diversion, as currently practiced, withstand constitutional
challenge under recent Supreme Court expositions of constitutional doctrine?
A. Due Process at the Preadjudication Stage
The series of decisions ending in McKeiver leave the constitutional status
of the juvenile justice system somewhat unclear. It is not the "discretionary,
paternalistic process of the pre-Gault era,"" nor is it the "rigid, highly regularized
adversary procedure of the adult criminal process.""3 In McKeiver, Justice
Blackmun described the unsettled situation:
[I]t is apparent that:
1. Some of the constitutional requirements attendant upon the state
criminal trial have equal application to that part of the state's juvenile pro-
ceeding that is adjudicative in nature ....
2. The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights constitutionally
assured to an adult accused of a crime also are to be enforced or made
available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding.74
1. Fundamental Fairness
In this unsettled situation, where some rights apply and some do not, there
is a need for a standard by which the applicability of a particular right can be
measured. From the fourteenth amendment requirement of due process, a
standard of "fundamental fairness,"" recognizing the "essentials of due process
and fair treatment,"7 emerges as a test7 ' for analyzing the juvenile court system.
Kent, Gault, Winship, and McKeiver reveal that the fundamental fairness stan-
dard is composed of four factors: 8 (1) the right must be a vital one," (2) the
right must remedy some defect in the juvenile system," (3) the right cannot
compel the states to abandon any substantive benefits of the juvenile process, 8
71 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10; Tappan, Unofficial Delinquencies, 29
NEB. L. Rnv. 547, 556-58 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Tappan]; Wallace & Brennan, supra
note 37, at 443-45; The Police, supra note 51, at 780-89.
72 Kay & Segal, supra note 68, at 1409.
73 Id.
74 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1971).
75 Id. at 543.
76 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
77 But see Comment, Miranda Warnings to Juveniles in Jersey: The Worst of Both Worlds
Revisited, 26 RuTGERs L. Rnv. 358 (1973). The writer there proposes the Court use a
"balancing test." Under it the Court would balance the "aspects of the juvenile process which
are beneficial to the juvenile . . . against the rights which must be accorded defendants in
criminal trials." Id. at 366.
78 See Parent's Presence, supra note 68, at 548. See also In re S., 73 Misc. 2d 187, 189,
341 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
79 E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (the "reasonable doubt" standard).
80 E.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (hearing is required prior to
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over child to adult court in order to remedy a past defect
in the juvenile process-the forfeiture of important statutory rights of the juvenile without
due process protections).
81 E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967) (the rights granted to juveniles do not require
state to abandon any benefits to children).
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and (4) the right must not be disruptive of the unique nature of the juvenile
process."2 If these criteria are met, due process requires that the right in question
be applied to the juvenile system.
Although Gault was limited to adjudications, it did not preclude extending
rights to other stages of the process:
We do not . . .consider the impact of these constitutional provisions
upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do
not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile "delinquents." For
example, we are not here concerned with the procedural or constitutional
rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we
direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process.8"
To determine the rights of the child at other stages84 in the juvenile process, it
seems reasonable to apply the "fundamental fairness" test. Yet the Court did
not explicitly state that this test was applicable to all phases of the juvenile sys-
tem, and indeed implied that it did not.
These [problems] relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made
as to whether a juvenile is a "delinquent." . . . As to these proceedings,
there appears to be little dissent from the proposition that the Due Process
Clause has a role to play. 5
In light of this language, and because the Court's discussion in the other juvenile
cases dealss only with the adjudicative stage, it may be argued that the due
process "fundamental fairness" test is inappropriate for the pretrial phase.
A number of commentators, however, disagree and find an implication to
the contrary in several Court decisions.8" In Haley v. Ohio"8 and Gallegos v.
Colorado9 (involving the inadmissibility of coerced pretrial confessions) and
Kent v. United States" (involving the requirements of a waiver hearing), the
Court granted constitutional rights to juveniles at other than the adjudicative
phase of juvenile court. Additionally, several federal courts, at both the district
and circuit levels, have held the fundamental fairness standard of due process
applicable to the preliminary hearing stage of the juvenile process.9
This latter conclusion is more reasonable. Concern for fairness should
compel the Court not to restrict its examination to just the adjudication hearing.
Unfair procedures can deprive a child of his rights at all stages in the juvenile
justice system. For this reason, the "fundamental fairness" test should apply to
the pretrial stage.
82 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544 (1971) (jury trial would be disruptive of
the juvenile process).
83 387 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added).
84 This is other than the adjudicatory stage.
85 387 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
86 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
87 Kay & Segal, supra note 68, at 549; S. Dak. juveniles, supra note 15, at 211-12.
88 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
89 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
90 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
91 E.g., Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Black Bonnett v. South Dakota, 357 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973).
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2. Fundamental Fairness Applied to the Pretrial Stage of the Juvenile System
Assuming that the fundamental fairness test applies, what constitutional
.ights attach at the preadjudicative stage of the juvenile system? There are two
approaches to this question. First, the test may be applied to constitutional rights
in toto as they would affect juveniles. If the four criteria are satisfied, it can be
argued that all constitutional rights that apply to adults should apply as well
to children. Second, the test may be applied right-by-right to determine indi-
vidually which rights are constitutionally required at pretrial.
Advocates of the former approach generally believe that all constitutional
rights possessed by adults should be granted to children. Their argument has
been based either on a literal reading of the Constitution-the Constitution does
not say that it applies only to adults 2-- or on the equal protection clause."
This argument, however, has not persuaded courts, and the weight of authority
is that all constitutional rights possessed by adults are not available to children."
The rights possessed by adults 5 at the pretrial stage are notice," probable
cause determination prior to arrest,r counsel,' privilege against self-incrimi-
nation,"9 freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, 0' freedom from excessive
bail, 1 and due process of law. 2 Of these rights, at the present time only the
92 Justice Black, concurring in Gault, declared:
[W]here a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted
for violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for
six years, I think the Constitution demands requires that he be tried in accordance
with the guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment ....
387 U.S. at 61.
Justice Douglas, dissenting in McKeiver, explained: "The Fourteenth Amendment ... speaks
of denial of rights to 'any person,' not denial of rights to any 'adult person.' . . ." 403 U.S. at
560. Cf. Carver & White, Constitutional Safeguards for the Juvenile Offender, 14 CRiME &
DELINQ. 63, 70-71 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Carver & White].
93 Childrens Liberation, supra note 14, at 191-96. Concurring in Gault, Justice Black
stated:
[I]t would be a plain denial of equal protection of the laws-an invidious discrimi-
nation-to hold that others subject to heavier punishment, because they are children,
be denied these same constitutional safeguards.
387 U.S. at 61.
94 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, noted:
The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an
adult accused of a crime are also to be enforced or made available to the juvenile
in his delinquency proceeding.
Id. at 533 (emphasis supplied).
95 For a discussion of the rights possessed by adults at the pretrial stage, see In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967).
96 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
97 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, made applicable to the states by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. V, made applicable to the states by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
100 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, made applicable to the states by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
101 U.S. CONST. -amend. VIII.
102 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 216 (1967) (proper identification procedures);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (in-custody protection from coerced confessions);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (waiver of rights must be voluntary); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (no coercive confessions). See also Skoler, The Right to
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right to counsel.. 3 and bail0 4 are not constitutionally required for children. The
right to a probable cause determination0 5 and reasonable searches and seizures10 0
are generally applicable to children, but may be modified slightly by the juvenile
process. The right to notice,' privilege against self-incrimination,"'8 and due
process of law0 9 are applicable to children.
To determine if these "adult" rights should apply in toto to juveniles at the
pretrial stage, each part of the four-part "fundamental fairness" test must be
examined. There is little doubt that these rights are "vital." If they are vital
to an adult, they are even more vital to a child facing possible incarceration or
other stigma of contact with the system. The first criteria therefore would seem
to be satisfied.
Whether the grant of these rights would remedy some defect in the juvenile
system is less certain. Those who feel that any juvenile court contact leaves a-
social stigma contend that all these rights are essential to fair treatment by the
juvenile system. Those who believe that the rehabilitative aspects of the juvenile
court system outweigh any stigma explain that the defects in the present system
are not significant enough to necessitate such major changes.
The latter two criteria, whether the grant of constitutional rights will cause
the abandonment of a benefit or be disruptive of the juvenile process, raise con-
flicting answers. The benefit to be protected is the informal, flexible treatment
that juveniles receive at pretrial stages of the judicial court system."' The only
court to study this issue was concerned solely with the right to counsel for juve-
niles at the pretrial stage, and it concluded that such a right would be "disruptive
of the juvenile process.""' By implication, then, if the right to counsel is disrup-
tive, the grant of rights in toto would also disrupt the process. However, one
juvenile court experimented with a system in which the child was granted all
Gault rights-notice, privilege against self-incrimination, and counsel-at the
pretrial stage." 2 This court concluded: "The application of Gault to the pre-
adjudicative stage of the juvenile process has not destroyed the purpose of the
juvenile court but has insured procedural uniformity and the accountability of
court personnel.""1
3
In general, conclusions concerning the application of "fundamental fair-
ness" to constitutional rights in toto depend upon subjective judgements about
the effectiveness of the rehabilitative programs of the juvenile system. Those
who support the court's informality and flexibility contend that extending con-
stitutional rights to children will destroy the uniquely juvenile aspects of the
Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Tuvenile Court Proceedings, 8 J. FAMILY L. 243 (1968),
reprinted in 43 IND. L.J. 558 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Skoler].
103 In re S., 73 Misc. 2d 187, 341 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
104 Note, The Constitutionality of Pre-Trial juvenile Proceedings in Texas-Especially
Detention, 14 S. Tax. L.J. 434, 447 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Pre-Trial Proceedings].
105 PAULSEN & WITEBREAD, supra note 19, at 73-78.
106 Id. at 80-89.
107 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). See Carver & White, supra note 92, at 65-67.
108 387 U.S. at 47, 55. See Parent's Presence, supra note 68, at 549.
109 PAULSEN & WurrEBREAD, supra note 19, at 89-109.
110 In re S., 73 Misc. 2d 187, 191, 341 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (Faro. Ct. 1973).
Ill Id.
112 Ralston, supra note 8, at 167.
113 Id. at 166.
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system.114 Those who distrust the juvenile court's informal treatment of youths
explain that granting constitutional rights will not destroy the court's rehabili-
tative mission, but improve protection of the children. Neither argument is
-ultimately persuasive, but existing authority, particularly McKeiver, casts doubt
on legal arguments that all constitutional rights should be extended to pread-
judicative stages. Legal challenges are more likely to be successful when aimed
at the failure to provide particular constitutional rights in diversion proceedings.
B. The Right to Counsel During Diversion
A particular constitutional right that has not generally been recognized at
-the pretrial stages of juvenile processing is the right to counsel. The sixth and
fourteenth amendments guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel." 5
The difficult question has been when does this right to counsel attach. The
Supreme Court has held that a person accused of a crime "requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him,""' and that there-
fore the constitutional principle is not limited to the presence of counsel at trial.
More specifically, the Court in United States v. Wade"7 declared that counsel is
required at any "critical stage" in the prosecution of a defendant where sub-
stantial rights are affected." 8 The Court explained that to determine whether the
case in question involved a "critical stage":
[W]e scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether
the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic
right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine
the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance at the trial itself.
It calls upon us [the Court] to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability
of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." 9
Utilizing this test, the Court has held that the Constitution requires counsel
at an arraignment, 2 ' a pretrial custodial interrogation,' 2 ' pretrial lineup,'22 and
a preliminary hearing. 3
However, in Kirby v. Illinois,'24 the Court appeared to limit the "critical
stage" test when it explained that "the right to counsel attaches only at or after
the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the de-
fendant] ."125 Holding that counsel was not required at a preindictment show-up,
the Court stated that such judicial proceedings begin upon the occurrence of a
114 73 Misc. 2d at 191, 341 N.Y.S.2d -at 15.
115 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
116 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
117 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
118 Id. at 224.
119 Id. at 227.
120 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
121 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
122 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
123 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
124 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
125 Id. at 688.
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"formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment."12  A further limitation on a "critical stage" was recently added in
Gerstein v. Pugh.2 There, the Court held that counsel was not constitutionally
required at a probable cause hearing addressed precisely to the issue of pretrial
detention (as distinguished from a probable cause hearing which contained ele-
ments of a preliminary hearing as well as the pretrial custody determination)."'s
The effect of Kirby and Gerstein on the right to counsel at the pretrial
diversionary stage prior to charges being initiated is uncertain.2 9 Kirby indicates
that the right to counsel does not attach until the decision has been made to
prosecute; any actions prior to that stage do not require the presence of defense
counsel. The Court explained in Kirby:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is .. . the starting point
of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that
the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the
adverse position of government and the defendant have solidified. It is then
that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organ-
ized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of
the "criminal prosecution" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment are applicable.'2
On the other hand, the holding in Wade, that counsel is required in any
"critical stage" of the prosecution, still applies. The basis for the Court's decision
in Wade was that: "[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal of informal, in court or
out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial." 2 Kirby's holding that a preindictment identification was not a "critical
stage" in the criminal prosecution does not necessarily foreclose a finding that pre-
trial diversion is a critical stage. Indeed, the Court has declared that a child has
a constitutional right to counsel at a waiver proceeding, 32 which is a pretrial
occurrence. The Court in Gault, however, specifically refused to rule on whether
the right to counsel applies at other stages of the juvenile system;. 3 thus the con-
stitutional status of the right to counsel at pretrial diversion is uncertain.'3 4
126 Id. at 689.
127 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
128 Id. at 108.
129 Where pretrial diversion occurs after formal charges have been initiated, the defendants
clearly have the right to counsel. ABA COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERVICES,
LEGAL ISSUES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMs (1974) [here-
inafter cited as ABA COMM'N].
130 406 U.S. at 489-90 (1972).
131 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (emphasis added).
132 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966).
133 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967). Some states require the appointment of coun-
sel immediately after the juvenile is taken into custody. See statutes cited in Ferster, Courtless
& Snethen, Separating Official and Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile Court Intake, 55 IOWA
L. REv. 864, 892 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ferster]. Only one state, however, specifically
requires counsel at the diversion proceeding. See COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-101 (1973).
134 Most of the adult diversionary programs in operation in the United States today do not
provide counsel for the defendants. See Balck, Deferred Prosecution: The Juvenilization of the
Criminal Justice System, 38 FED. PROBATION 46, 48 (1974); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the
Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 840-42 (1974).
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1. Arguments Against Juvenile Right to Counsel at Diversionary Stage
Arguments opposing right to counsel at pretrial diversion are: (1) Kirby
hiolds that there is no such right; (2) Wade does not apply at pretrial diversion,
for the right to a fair trial is not endangered and therefore does not involve a
"critical stage"; and, (3) an examination of the right to counsel at this stage in
accordance with the four-part "due process" test reveals that the grant of counsel
-would disrupt the juvenile system.
The first of these arguments proceeds by applying Kirby to the diversion
process. In most instances," 5 the diversion decision is made prior to initiation of
the formal criminal process when the right to counsel attaches according to
Kirby. The police decision to refer a case to juvenile court or dispose of it in
another way, the intake official's decision to forward the case to trial or divert
it to some informal program, and the community social service agency decision
to terminate a child's informal treatment and refer the case to juvenile court
are all made before the criminal process begins.
Examination of Kirby also rebuts the argument that Wade requires counsel
at the diversion decision because diversion is a "critical stage." Kirby specifically
distinguished the ruling in Wade and Gilbert v. California :136 "The rationale of
those cases was that an accused is entitled to counsel at any 'critical stage' of the
prosecution."' 7 The key word, as emphasized by Justice Stewart, is "prosecu-
tion." Where, as in pretrial diversion, the formal prosecution stage of the
criminal process has not started, then the right to counsel does not attach.
Secondly, while the Wade "critical stage" holding can be used to support
granting the right to counsel to juveniles at the diversion proceeding, opponents
explain that this interpretation is incorrect. Wade holds that counsel must be
provided "where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a
fair trial."' 3 " The basis for the Court's holding is that "the presence of . . .
counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial."'3 9 The
Court's reason for insisting upon counsel for a criminal defendant is to ensure a
fair trial. In juvenile pretrial diversion, however, any investigation and sub-
sequent decision by police or officials will not affect the fairness of the child's
trial. The diversion decision merely determines whether or not the youth will go
to trial. This is especially true in those states which expressly prohibit the use of
any admissions or confessions made by the child at the diversion proceeding as
evidence at a later adjudicatory hearing. " ' The third argument applies the due
process "fundamental fairness" test to right to counsel. The only case on this
issue, In re S.,' decided by the Family Court of the City of New York, did not
135 It is usually only after the initiation of the criminal process-the filing of the petition-
that diversion decisions are made by the prosecutor, court official, or judge.
136 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
137 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
138 388 U.S. at 226. The Court identified a critical stage as "those pretrial procedures
that would impair a defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without
counsel." Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
139 388 U.S. at 227.
140 Ferster, supra note 133, at 889; Foster & Freed, Family Law, 1973 Survey of New
York Law, 25 SYRA. L. Rzv. 401, 425 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foster & Freed]. Contra,
Skoler, supra note 102, at 568.
141 73 Misc. 2d 187, 341 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Faro. Ct. 1973).
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discuss the first three criteria of the test, but based its decision on the last factor,
disruption of the juvenile process. After examining the legal basis for this cri-
terion, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'42 the court concluded:
[T]he presence of counsel at informal intake would in effect convert that
conference to a formal rigid adversary proceeding, halting the free exchange
of ideas which is buttressed by statutory absolute privilege, and relegating
this conference to the redundancy of a minor trial prior to a trial, thereby
emasculating the innovative techniques of probation services.
143
Thus, opponents of the right to counsel at the preadjudication diversion will
contend that the presence of the attorney would disrupt the flexibility of the
unique juvenile system, and therefore the right to counsel for juveniles should not
attach.'44
2. Arguments for Juvenile Right to Counsel at Diversionary Stage
Proponents of the right to counsel for juveniles also base their arguments
on Wade, Kirby, and the "due process" test. They contend that the pretrial
diversion is a "critical stage" within the meaning of Wade, and, further, that the
presence of counsel would not disrupt the juvenile court process.
A central theme of the argument for the right to counsel at preadjudicative
juvenile proceedings for juveniles is that Kirby and Wade should be liberally
construed. What is important to understand, proponents argue, is the basis of the
decision in Wade, that an accused should be provided counsel to protect his
rights at any critically important stage in the criminal process. The Court's
language demonstrates its desire for the protection that counsel can provide the
accused. "[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out."'4 5
If the Court is concerned with an adult "standing alone" against the state, they
should be doubly cautious when a child stands alone against the prosecutor."'
Legal commentators are in near unanimous agreement that the diver-
sion proceeding is a critical stage. 4 ' The diversion decision determines whether
a petition will be filed and a formal delinquency hearing held, 4 " whether the case
will be dismissed or diverted to some unofficial resolution,"' whether any official
delinquency and resultant stigma will attach,' and whether, in jurisdictions
142 403 U.S. 528 (1972).
143 73 Misc. 2d at 191, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
144 See note 39 & accompanying text supra.
145 388 U.S. at 224.
146 See Note, Interrogation-Parens Patriae v. Miranda: Conflicting Interests, 3 SETO1r
HALL L. Rav. 482, 489 (1972).
147 ABA COMM'N, supra note 129, at 11; Paulsen, supra note 17, -at 189; Skoler, supra
note 102, at 567; Pre-Trial Proceedings, supra note 104, at 443; Note, The Need for Counsel
in the Juvenile Justice System: Due Process Overdue, 1974 UTAH L. Rlv. 333, 345 [herein-
after cited as Need for Counsel].
148 Skoler, supra note 102, at 567; Need for Counsel, supra note 147, at 346-48.
149 Comment, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Intake Processes, 13 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 69, 80 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Role of Attorney]; Need for Counsel, supra note
147, at 346-48.
150 Skoler, supra note 102, -at 567.
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where the intake official makes the detention decision, the child will be confined
until the court hearing. 5 '
Furthermore, the diversion proceeding is "critical" because at this stage the
child's privilege against self-incrimination is in jeopardy." 2 Gault held that
juveniles were entitled to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination
at any criminal interrogation:
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults .... The
participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police. . . in administering
the privilege.
1 53
Once it is clear that juveniles have the right against self-incrimination, it is
important to determine when this privilege attaches. Miranda v. Arizona54
held that the right was effective at any "custodial interrogation." No court has
considered whether a juvenile diversion proceeding is such a "custodial interroga-
tion," but a convincing argument can be made that it is. At intake, the court
officials question the child about the alleged offense. The child's answers may be
used against him in a variety of ways. It may form the basis of the intake officer's
decision to divert the case or refer it to court, clearly a crucial decision to the
child. It may be used to impeach the youth's court testimony in any later trial,
and, in most states, it may even be used against the child as a valid confession in
a later court adjudication.'55 Again, the reason for granting the right to counsel
to adults at pretrial custodial interrogations is equally applicable, if not more
applicable, to children. It has been argued that because of their age and lack of
education, children need greater protections than adults when confronted with
official interrogation 56
The diversion proceeding should therefore be considered an exceptionally
"critical stage" in the juvenile process. As such, counsel is necessary for the
child so that his right against self-incrimination may be protected and so that he
will not face the state "alone" when the crucial diversion decision is made. This
conclusion is supportable even in light of the Gault decision requiring counsel
only at the adjudicatory hearing. William Ralston summarizes:
[T]he Court's statement that the decision did not extend to the preadjudica-
tion stages seems inconsistent with its holdings relating to the right to an at-
torney, the right against self-incrimination, and the general application of
Miranda, as well as the Court's statement that the assistance of counsel is
essential at every step of the delinquency proceeding against a child.
5 7
151 Id. See Pre-Trial Proceedings, supra note 104, at 443-44; Need for Counsel, supra
note 147, at 353-56.
152 Need for Counsel, supra note 147, at 346.
153 387 U.S. at 55.
154 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
155 Skoler, supra note 102, at 568. A few states, however, prohibit the use of a child's
intake conversations in any later court hearing. See Ferster, supra note 134, at 890-91.
156 Need for Counsel, supra note 147, at 342-44, 346. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
44-56 (1967).
157 Ralston, supra note 8, at 165.
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As noted earlier,158 one court has held that the Kent-Winship-McKeiver
due process test does not justify the extension of the right to counsel for juveniles
at the intake stage. Those who advocate the right to counsel for juveniles ques-
tion the correctness of this ruling. 9 They contend that granting the right to
counsel will not disrupt the juvenile process, but will improve it. The attorney
can provide needed information to the intake officials concerning the personal
aspects of each case, the child's behavior, attitude, home life, and future plans.1
6
0
The counsel can more effectively present the views of the parents and child, wh&
may lack refined communication skills. 6' Additionally, the lawyer may by his
mere presence ensure that the intake staff or any other official does not take
action contrary to the child's welfare or the law.'62
One juvenile court has experimented with granting all the Gault rights,
including the right to counsel, to juveniles at the intake stage. Its conclusion is
this:
The application of Gault to the pre-adjudication process has not
destroyed the purpose of the juvenile court, but has insured procedural un-
iformity and the accountability of court personnel .... Parents and the
accused child usually appreciate the fact that their case has not been pre-
judged by intake personnel and are more receptive to the interview. In
most instances, they are pleased that their case can be adjusted without court
action and agree to cooperate in any programs. ... 163
In addition to helping rather than disrupting the intake process, extending
the right to counsel to the pretrial stage meets the other criteria of the "due
process" test. It can be argued that the counsel's presence is vital, both to protect
the child's legal rights and to present the youth's personal case. The presence of
counsel would also remedy a defect in the juvenile process, that of making critical
decisions without legal protections. Further, the right to counsel would not
compel the abandonment of any substantial benefit to the juvenile; the process
could operate with a variety of flexible and individualized treatment altema-
tives and still maintain the benefits of informality, including lack of a "criminal"
record, no loss of civil rights, confidentiality, and flexibility in disposition.
The proponents, then, would conclude that the due process test has been
satisfied; that "fundamental fairness" requires that counsel be provided to
children at the pretrial diversion stage. Alternatively, they would argue that the
pretrial diversion proceeding is a "critical stage" under Wade and, therefore,
counsel must attach at that time. Their arguments are convincing and supported
by Gault. Despite the fact that the holding in Gault was limited to the adjudica-
tion stage of the juvenile process, the language of the decision displays the im-
portance which the Supreme Court attributes to the assistance of counsel.
158 See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra..
159 Foster & Freed, supra note 140, at 425; Skoler, supra note 102, at 566-68.
160 S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15, at 218.
161 Paulsen, supra note 17, at 188-89.
162 Role of Attorney, supra note 149, at 71.
163 Ralston, supra note 8, at 167. This experiment took place in the Juvenile and Domestic
Court of Falls Church, Va.
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The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law,
to make a skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it. The child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.16'
C. Right to Probable Cause Determination Prior to Diversion
One of the functions of intake is to determine if there is sufficient evidence
to support a finding of probable cause that the juvenile committed the offense
alleged. This determination is intended to ensure the dismissal of any case
referred to juvenile court that lacks probable cause to believe the child com-
mitted the criminal act. However, since an intake official has practically absolute
discretion in handling a case, it is to be expected that cases are either referred to
court or diverted even though there may be no probable cause to believe the child
committed the offense. This raises the issue whether a juvenile has a constitu-
tional right to a probable cause determination prior to any diversion decision. No
cases have directly considered this question, but decisions on an analogous issue,
whether a child is entitled to a probable cause hearing prior to a juvenile court
trial, are in conflict. 65
1. Constitutional Right of Adults to Probable Cause Hearing
The fourth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment, requires that no person shall be seized without probable cause.
Probable cause in adult cases may be determined in two ways: (1) indictment
or presentment by a grand jury or (2) information filed by the prosecuting
attorney. 6 While the fifth amendment to the Constitution compels the federal
government to use a grand jury indictment, this requirement has not been ex-
tended to the states. 6 The states therefore may use either a prosecutor's in-
formation or a grand jury indictment to charge a person with a crime.
Historically, an accused had no right to a probable cause hearing.' This
has been altered slightly by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. In Gerstein
v. Pugh,"9 the Court required a probable cause hearing for an accused charged
by an information "as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest."' The Court had the opportunity to require a probable cause hearing
for all persons charged by an information, but declined to do so. Despite its dis-
cussion of the evils of unilateral prosecutorial discretion, and its citation of cases
164 387 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).
165 Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1969). Contra, Black Bonnett v. South Dakota, 357 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973);
M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
166 25 VAND. L. Rx.v. 434, 436 (1972).
167 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). This is one of only two constitutional
guarantees in the Bill of Rights that has not been made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment.
168 Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586
(1913); People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 310-11, 298 N.E.2d 109, 113,
301 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (1973) ; M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 30, 313-14 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
169 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
170 Id. at 105.
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in which the Court required that a neutral and detached magistrate make the
probable cause decision, 7' the Court limited its ruling to only those persons
charged by an information who are in pretrial detention.
Despite the Court's failure to find that a probable cause hearing is required
for all persons, the Court has consistently warned against the power of a
prosecutor to unilaterally refer a case to tria' 2 without a probable cause deter-
mination by a neutral and detached magistrate. 3 Likewise, the Court has re-
quired that probable cause to issue a search 74 or arrest warrant,'75 or to compel
the return to custody of a paroled individual,'76 be determined by an independent
judicial official.
2. Constitutional Right of Juveniles to Probable Cause Hearing
As with adults, historically there has been no constitutional right to a
probable cause hearing for juveniles. 7 Since the right to a grand jury indict-
ment has never been constitutionally required for children,"" this means that all
juvenile petitions are completed and forwarded to trial based solely on the uni-
lateral decision of the police and intake officials.' The issue arises whether this
is permissible under the fourth and fourteenth amendments. Several federal
courts have discussed the problem in recent years with conflicting results
80
Cooley v. Stone'.' and Brown v. Fauntleroy8 2 held that a pretrial probable
cause hearing is constitutionally required for arrested juveniles. Cooley ruled that
such a right was required for children detained pending trial, while Brown ex-
tended the right to all juveniles regardless of whether they are in custody. The
basis for Cooley, partly relied on by the Brown court, is:
No person can be lawfully held in penal .custody by the state without a
prompt judicial determination of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment
so provides and this constitutional mandate applies to juveniles as well as
adults. Such is the teaching of Gault and the teaching of Kent.'
171 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1970); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
172 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1942).
173 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970); Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480 (1958); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1942).
174 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
175 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Giordenello v. United States, 357
U.S. 480 (1958); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
176 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971).
177 People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 298 N.E.2d 109, 113, 301
N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (1973).
178 Id.
179 See generally Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 n.3 (1966); People ex rel.
Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 298 N.E.2d 109, 113, 301 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393
(1973).
180 Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Black Bonnett v. South Dakota, 257 F. Supp. 889 (D.S.D. 1973); M.A.P. v.
Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
181 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
182 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
183 Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d
838, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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M.A.P. v. Regan,:"" which held that a probable cause hearing before trial is
not required for children, pointed out that the Cooley rationale is presumptuous.
M.A.P. explained that it has not been definitely declared that there is a con-
stitutional right to a probable cause hearing for adults; therefore, there is no such
right for juveniles.'
The alternative basis for Brown is more convincing. Brown noted that the
probable cause hearing is constitutionally required, for "[the child] has the right
to have the validity of the seizure [arrest] determined since he will be called to
trial for conduct which led to the seizure."' 86 Brown explained that "[u]nless
probable cause is at the foundation of the status in which [the juvenile] is placed
by the arrest, it is an unlawful status imposed by public authority."'8 7 The essence
of this argument is that a pretrial probable cause hearing requirement derives
from the constitutional necessity of probable cause for arrest. This argument
especially applies to juveniles, since they are arrested and referred to juvenile
court without grand jury indictment or any other type of probable cause deter-
mination.
M.A.P. disagreed with this Brown rationale as well, but not as convincingly.
M.A.P. explained that the "purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine
whether there is probable cause to hold the accused and not whether there was
cause to arrest him."'88 Therefore, M.A.P. reasons, the determination at a pre-
trial hearing is separate from probable cause for arrest. The court in M.A.P. is
right in stating that a purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether
there is cause to detain the accused. But it is wrong in asserting that that is the
only function, for another purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine
if there is sufficient cause to refer the case to trial. For juveniles, who are arrested
and referred to trial without any probable cause determination, such a hearing
is essential.
A remaining issue is whether the right to a probable cause hearing would
satisfy the Kent-Winship-McKeiver "due process" test. The right to probable
cause determination is "vital"; it is explicitly provided for in the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The grant of such a right would remedy
the present untenable situation in which a child is bound over for trial or receives
some informal disposition without a reasonable showing that he has committed
the offense alleged. Additionally, extending the right to a probable cause de-
termination would not disrupt the juvenile process nor prevent the child from
receiving any of the benefits to be gained from the system. At most, the probable
cause determination would be a minor inconvenience to the juvenile system and
in no way affect its rehabilitative objective.
Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, therefore, a probable cause
hearing for juveniles should be required.
184 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
185 Id. at 313-15.
186 442 F.2d at 842.
187 Id.
188 285 A.2d at 315.
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3. Juvenile Right to Probable Cause Determination Prior to Diversion
While decisions on the juvenile's constitutional right to a probable cause
hearing are in conffict, the better position is that a probable cause hearing is
compelled by the fourth and fourteenth amendments, as declared by Brown v.
Fauntleroy."8 ' A remaining issue, crucial to the thousands of juveniles diverted
each year from the juvenile court, is whether such a hearing must be held prior
to any diversion decision by court intake personnel.
The initial reaction to this question is that no hearing need be conducted
since diversion to some informal disposition is not an adjudicated court deci-
sion. A diversion decision results in no court trial, no determination of de-
linquency, and no juvenile court stigma. Diversion may, however, result in loss of
liberty, loss of money, and the establishment of a police and court contact record.
Gerstein v. Pugh,9 ' citing the "significant restraint[s] on liberty""' imposed
by pretrial detention and pretrial release conditions,'92 held that a probable
cause hearing was necessary for an accused placed in custody after being charged
by an information.'93 Even though juvenile preadjudication diversion does not
result in penal custody, it generally does deprive the child of liberty in some
manner. If pretrial release conditions are sufficient to require a probable cause
hearing, then pretrial diversionary restrictions deserve similar procedures.
To the diverted child, the diversion decision is in effect the adjudication and
disposition of his case. If he does not get a probable cause determination prior
to the diversion decision, he will never get one. The result, then, would be a
criminal charge and disposition, without a probable cause determination by a
neutral and detached person. In view of these consequences, informal disposi-
tion should not occur unless a probable cause determination has been made.
IV. Further Recommendations for Protection of Juvenile
Rights During Diversion
Constitutional doctrines describe a core of individual rights which the state
is legally bound to respect, but these doctrines should not be regarded as more
than a minimum standard for protection of individual rights. Scrutiny of the
diversion process, therefore, should go beyond constitutional rights. Certain
diversion practices, while not necessarily unconstitutional, are undesirable because
they either unjustifiably infringe on the juvenile's liberty or hinder the juvenile
system's goal of rehabilitation.
A. Statutory Time Limits Must Be Placed on Diversion Programs
One repeated criticism of the present diversion system is the lack of time
limits on diversion programs. 9 ' Instances have been cited in which a child has
189 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
190 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
191 Id. at 105.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Seymour, Youth Service Bureaus, 7 LAw & Soc'y Rov. 247, 269 (1972).
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been kept on informal probation for several years,'95 or a case delayed for many
months, while the intake officer decided whether to refer the case to juvenile
court.
96
These flagrant examples of improper use of diversion should be prevented,
and recently state statutes have been amended to do just that. 9 The National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has proposed a
30- or 60-day limit for reaching some type of diversion agreement, and recom-
mends that the period of supervision be limited to six months. 9 It seems ap-
propriate, therefore, to require that state juvenile statutes be amended to provide
that the intake staff have 60 days to either informally divert a case, dismiss it, or
refer it for court adjudication.19 9 Additionally, state law should place a six-month
limit on the duration of any diversion program
2 0 0
B. Juvenile Statements Made During Diversion Conferences Must Be
Prohibited from Use in Any Later Court Proceeding
Statements made by a child during diversion conferences can be critically
important. They are used to determine whether the child should be diverted from
juvenile court and what type of program he should enter, and in most states
they may be used against the child in a later court proceeding as a lawful con-
fession, or to impeach the child's in-court testimony.
A few states prohibit the later in-court use of pretrial conference state-
ments,2"' and others should follow suit. The goal of the juvenile justice system
is rehabilitation, and diversion is now the recommended method of accomplish-
ing that goal. This rehabilitation effort is hindered when statements made by the
child in pretrial diversion discussions can later be used against him. With a con-
structive diversion program as the objective, the child is urged to talk and to
cooperate fully with the intake staff. In this manner, an informal and personal
diversion program can be agreed upon by the intake officer, child, parent, and
counsel. To permit the child's statements to be used against him in court not only
inhibits free and productive discussion, but is a practice that can only reduce the
child's respect for the legal system. Using these statements against the child in
subsequent juvenile proceedings should be statutorily prohibited.
20 2
195 Wallace & Brennan, supra note 37, at 445.
196 The Police, supra note 51, at 790.
197 New York allows two months to reach an informal adjustment. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT
§ 734(c) (McKinney 1963). California intake staffs have six months in which to achieve an
informal disposition. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODS § 654 (West 1975). Texas state law
authorizes informal adjustment, but does not permit it to exceed six months. Tax FAm. CODE
ANN. § 53.03 (1975).
198 NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMM'N ON CRI. JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, CoRRECTIONS
Std. 8.2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L ADVIsORY Coms'N].
199 Ferster & Courtless, The Intake Process in the Affluent County Juvenile Court, 22
HAsTINGs L.J. 1127, 1152 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ferster & Courtless].
200 Gough, supra note 39, at 738; Comment, The Consent Decree and New York Family
Court Procedure in "JD" and "PINS" Cases, 23 SYRA. L. Rv. 1211, 1223 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. Consent Decree].
201 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 703-8(5) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §2
334, 735 (McKinney .1963).
202 NAT'L ADvrsoRY COMm'N, supra note 198, at Std. 8.2; Gough, supra note 39, at 738;
S. Dak. Juveniles, supra note 15, at 218.
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C. The Petitioner Should Not Be Permitted Absolute Authority to Refer
a Child to Juvenile Court
Most state laws permit a petitioner to refer a juvenile case to court no matter
what other disposition is recommended by the police, intake staff, or probation
service.2"' These provisions are justified by the principle of retribution: the victim
of the child's act should have the right to require the juvenile to appear in
court.2 4
This justification is insufficient, however, for two reasons. First, the juvenile
court system does not exist to vindicate private wrongs, 0 5 but to rehabilitate
juvenile offenders. Second, even the victim of a crime committed by an adult
does not have the right to require the alleged perpetrator to appear in court;
only a grand jury or magistrate has such authority." 6
One article has suggested as a middle ground that the intake staff have
authority to refuse to refer a case to court, and the frustrated complainant can
protest such a decision in writing to the juvenile judge.0 7 The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's Model Act for Family Courts recommends that
a frustrated petitioner be permitted to appeal to the juvenile court prosecutor.0
These provisions are an improvement over the present situation, but they are too
modest. When the intake staff makes a referral decision, it should not be subject
to challenge by the petitioner. His interest in vindication is dearly subordinate to
the juvenile system's rehabilitative objective, and juvenile court officers are
qualified to judge the facts in that perspective.
V. Conclusion
Diversion has become the recommended technique in combating youth
crime, and the advantages are manifest. It offers a flexible, innovative, and
relatively informal approach to juvenile delinquency that allows emphasis on
rehabilitation of the child and minimizes the stigma of criminality.
But diversion is not without its problems. Serious constitutional questions
are raised by present diversion practices. With increased use of diversion should
come procedural safeguards to ensure that the advantages of the technique do not
run roughshod over the rights of the children. Foremost among the constitutional
shortcomings of the present diversion system is that counsel is not available to the
child during diversionary proceedings. When one-half of all cases referred to
juvenile court are diverted, it clearly is a "critical stage"; the right to counsel
should attach. Second, there should be an affirmative determination prior to any
diversion decision that probable cause exists to believe that the apprehended
child has committed the alleged offense. Not only is this requirement constitu-
tionally mandated, but it is good police and court practice.
203 E.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 734(b) (McKinney 1963).
204 N.Y. Consent Decree, supra note 200, at 1218.
205 In re R., 67 Misc. 2d 452, 454, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (Fain. Ct. 1971).
206 N.Y. Consent Decree, supra note 200, at 1219.
207 Ferster & Courtless, supra note 199, at 1150.
208 OFFICE OF YOUTH DEV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MODEL ACTS FOR
FAMILY COURTS AND STATE-LOCAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAMS 64 (1974).
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Certain nonconstitutional deficiencies in the juvenile system should also be
corrected. Time limits should be set for making the diversion decision so that the
juvenile offender does not languish in uncertainty. In order that juveniles not feel
inhibited about discussing their alleged offense in diversionary conferences, pro-
hibitions against subsequent use of statements made in these conferences should be
legislated. And finally, to protect the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court
system, petitioners should be stripped of their right to demand adjudication.
The idea of diversion is excellent. But the acceptance and effectiveness of
the program are reduced by its insufficient respect for the rights of the child. By
instituting these recommended constitutional and procedural safeguards, diversion
should become an even more useful process in the effort to curb juvenile
delinquency.
